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A PUBLIC GOODS APPROACH TO
CALCULATING REASONABLE FEES
UNDER ATTORNEY FEE
SHIFTING STATUTES*
INTRODUCTION
Commentators on statutory attorney fee shifting "rank among our
most adept navel-gazers."' Indeed, the proliferation of literature exam-
ining attorney fee shifting statutes seems to be matched only by the
proliferation of such statutes.2 A reasonable person therefore might read
the title of this Note and ask, "Why more?" Justification for continued
study stems from the complete lack of consensus on most major issues
arising under such statutes and the increasing use of fee shifting to pro-
mote certain forms of civil action.3 One need look no further than the
Supreme Court for evidence of this lack of consensus: in virtually every
fee shifting case decided recently, the Court either has split five-to-four4
or has failed to muster a majority. 5
* The author thanks Professor Jerome Culp for his helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
Note. All errors in reasoning remain solely those of the author.
1. See generally Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38, 43 (1936) (criticizing all
law review writers).
2. For a sampling of articles examining attorney fee shifting statutes, see note 14, infra. For a
discussion of the number of statutes, see Percival & Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in
Public Interest Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 233 (number of federal stat-
utes has topped 150).
3. See supra note 2 (150 federal statutes provide for fee shifting), The statutes include, e.g,,
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982); Civil Rights Act of
1964, Title II, 42 U.S.C § 2000a-3(b) (1982); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C § 3612(c) (-);
Voting Rights Amendment of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee-4(c) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
4. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987) (whether claiming "prevailing party" status, for
purposes of attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, party must receive at least some relief on
merits of claim); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (whether courts can reasonably
award fees significantly in excess of monetary damages); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)
(whether the "extent of success" in litigation should be considered in determining amount of attor-
ney fees awarded); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989) (five-to-three split on issue of
enhancement of fee award against state on basis of delay in payment).
5. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987)
[hereinafter Delaware Valley 11] (split four-to-one-to-four on whether enhancement of lodestar to
compensate attorney for assuming risk of loss is impermissible under fee-shifting statutes).
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A particularly troublesome issue for courts has been shaping a
workable standard to meet the statutorily undefined requirement that the
amount of a fee award be "reasonable."' 6 The Supreme Court has mud-
dled through this problem of standard setting with a lack of consensus
and clarity7 while lower courts have struggled to apply the Court's deci-
sions,8 and commentators have tried to make sense of the judicial mo-
rass.9 As a result, many civil rights cases ° today involve two distinct
steps: (1) a determination of the substantive rights involved, 1 and (2) a
protracted dispute over the "reasonableness" of attorney's fees for the
prevailing party.12 The definition of a reasonable fee serves as the subject
not only of this Note, but also of countless other judicial opinions13 and
scholarly articles.14 This Note, however, differs from prior investiga-
tions of the fee problem to the extent that it advocates a public goods
mechanism to determine reasonableness.
This Note argues that, at least in the civil rights context, most
courts and commentators have forgotten the general purpose of fee shift-
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [various
civil rights statutes], the court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.").
7. See NATIONAL ASs'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CIVIL
RIGHTS ATrORNEY'S FEES AcT OF 1976, at 27-30 (1984) (finding that judiciary has failed to set
meaningful standards for determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee and recom-
mending Congress set maximum of $75 per hour).
8. See infra notes 31, 34 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 14 (current scholarly analysis on attorney fee shifting).
10. The term "civil rights" is used somewhat loosely in this Note, but generally refers to those
rights protected by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (employment discrimination and admissions policies), 1982
(discriminatory property transactions), 1983 (all official discrimination including racial segregation
and infringements of first amendment rights), 1985 (conspiracies to deny equal protection), and 1986
(same) (1982).
11. See, eg., Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 651 F. Supp. 1528, 1531 (D.D.C.
1986) (noting that litigation involving substantive issues ended in settlement in 1985) aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 826 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated in part on reh'g, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (en bane).
12. See, eg., Cumberland Mountains, 857 F.2d at 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en bane) (noting that
since 1985 litigation has been limited to attorneys fees).
13. See, e.g., Delaware Valley II. 483 U.S. at 711; Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986) [hereinafter Delaware Valley 1]; Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); McKenzie v. Kennickell, (No. 88-5155)
(D.C. Cir. May 23, 1989); Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (en bane); Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
14. See, e.g., Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"? 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 281 (1977); Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem,
1986 DUKE L.J. 435; Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473
(1981); Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651,
673-78; Comment, Nonpayment Risk Multipliers: Incentives or Windfalls, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1074
(1986).
Vol. 1989:438]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1989:438
ing statutes: to provide for complete enforcement of rights Congress has
deemed worthy of special protection. The courts' loss of focus on the
underlying purpose of these statutes has led to the current confusion in
fee shifting jurisprudence. This Note proposes that courts recognize fee
shifting statutes for what they really are: a mechanism to provide an
important "public good."' 15 Using the example of statutory civil rights
actions, this Note will demonstrate that many fee shifting statutes serve
as a means of providing public goods. Relying on a public goods analy-
sis, this Note shows how a reasonable base fee16 that achieves Congress's
goals can be calculated. 17 To that end, the Note will demonstrate that
focusing on the opportunity cost to society of providing civil rights en-
forcement yields the best calculation of a reasonable fee.1 8 In other
words, a reasonable fee should equal the fee that the attorney could have
received had she not represented the civil rights plaintiff.
This Note will be limited to statutory fee shifting in civil rights cases
and will not specifically address any other type of fee shifting statute.' 9
The limited scope of this Note should not suggest that the following anal-
ysis holds relevance only for civil rights cases-this analysis can properly
extend to other statutory schemes used to provide public goods. Rather,
15. The definition of a public good will be explored in greater detail infra notes 55-68 and
accompanying text. In general terms, a public good is a good that must be provided through collec-
tive action because, once provided, no person can feasibly be excluded from consuming the benefits
of the good (e.g., national defense). Characteristically, one person's consumption of a public good
does not diminish the supply of the good to all other consumers.
The change from a non-fee-shifting rule to some form of fee shifting does not imply that public
goods are involved. A public good is not involved, for example, when fee shifting is used to punish a
party for bringing a frivolous suit. Likewise, the adoption of the European approach that encourages
the liberal use of fee shifting, see generally Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee
Shifting, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 37, creates no presumption that a public good
is being provided. This Note examines only situations in which Congress has affirmatively decided
to use fee shifting as a mechanism to provide greater availability of something that coincidentally
satisfies the definition of public good.
16. The "base fee" is simply a fee award made without judicial adjustments for risk of nonpay-
ment or delay in payment. In most instances, the base fee will equal the reasonable fee. See infra
notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 126-42 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 143-69 and accompanying text.
19. Although this Note is primarily concerned with The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)), many cases
discussed herein involve other fee shifting statutes in such areas as environmental protection and
Freedom of Information Act litigation. The particular statute at issue in each case holds no signfi-
cance, however, because the Supreme Court has stated that all fee shifting statutes should be identi-
cally interpreted. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) ("The standards set forth
in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fee
to a 'prevailing party.' ") For a comprehensive list of the various fee shifting statutes, see 3 M.
DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEEs 29.01-45.07 (1989).
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the limited focus provides a convenient setting for developing the impor-
tant underlying principles.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING LAW
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 20 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the traditional American rule that parties should bear
the costs of their own attorneys21 and held that the rule applies in all
cases unless Congress has expressly provided otherwise.22 The public in-
terest bar, devastated by the Alyeska decision, lobbied Congress to re-
spond quickly to the new requirement for express authorization. 23 In the
civil rights area, Congress responded with The Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976 (commonly referred to as section 1988).24 Sec-
tion 198825 was enacted with the express intent of negating the effect of
the Alyeska decision in cases involving statutory civil rights.26
Under section 1988, a party must show that it "prevailed" in the
underlying action.27 The court then will award attorney's fees unless it
determines, in its discretion, that the circumstances of the case do not
justify such an award.28 If the court determines that the circumstances
20. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
21. The rule was first recognized in this country in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306
(1796). See generally Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., winter 1984, at 9.
22. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260-62.
23. See COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FI-
NANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 314-20 (1976) (recommending congressional re-
sponse in the form of either a general authorization in all public interest cases or specific
authorizations in certain areas of public interest law).
24. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982))[hereinafter section
1988].
25. Section 1988 provides in relevant part that, "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 [of title 42] .... the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
26. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5908, 5909 ("[The] purpose of this amendment is to remedy anomalous gaps in our
civil rights laws created by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Alyeska Pipeline
.... "); H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3; 122 CONG. REC. 31,471 (1976) (statement of
Sen. Mathias); id. at 35,114-15 (statement of Rep. Anderson).
27. The "prevailing party" requirement is generally quite easy to satisfy. No formal relief need
be obtained in favor of the prevailing party, S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 26, at 5, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5912, and the party need only secure a result from the action
that favorably "affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff," Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S.
755, 761 (1987). See also Miller v. Staats, 706 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing prevailing
party standard); Commissioners Court v. United States, 683 F.2d 435, 441-43 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(same).
28. Congress apparently intended that a prevailing party "should ordinarily recover an attor-
ney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjnst [sic]." S. REP. No. 1011,
supra note 26, at 4 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters. Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)), re-
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justify such an award of attorney's fees, the real battle begins: the court
then must establish a "reasonable" fee.
Although the Supreme Court has been less than clear in articulating
a general method for calculating a reasonable base fee, the Court appears
to call for an approach combining elements of the "subjective factor"
method and the "lodestar" method. 29 The subjective factor method
traces its origin back to the Senate report30 advocating passage of the bill
that became section 1988. In that report, the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee cited Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 31 as a case that cor-
rectly determined a reasonable fee.32 Johnson listed twelve nonexclusive
factors that should, on a case-by-case basis and weighted according to the
discretion of the court, bear on determinations of reasonable fees.33 The
lodestar method, in comparison, is a judicially created doctrine that
originated in the 1973 decision of Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. 34 Using the lodestar method,
the court determines reasonable fees by multiplying the market value of
an hour of the prevailing attorney's time by a reasonable number of
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5912. Courts have held that an award would
be unjust only in the presence of a long litany of special circumstances that disfavor the prevailing
party. See, eg., Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1979) (judge's denial of award for
attorney's fees not an abuse of discretion since case involved principally private benefit, isolated
conduct, no bad faith, high chance of success, and adequate compensation available to attorney
through the recovery); Green v. Carbaugh, 460 F. Supp. 1193, 1194-95 (E.D. Va. 1978) (fee shifting
may not be appropriate where the prevailing party has the ability to pay, and case involves private
benefit, isolated conduct, and plaintiff has significant pecuniary motives).
29. See Note, Attorney's Fee Contingency Enhancements: Toward a Complete Incentive to Liti.
gate Under Federal Fee-Shifting Statutes, 63 WASH. L. REv. 469, 472 (1988) (articulating the hybrid
approach of computing fee awards).
30. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 26, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADMIN. NEws
5908.
31. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
32. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 26, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5913.
33. The factors are:
1. Time and labor required.
2. Novelty and difficulty of issues.
3. Skill required to perform legal services.
4. Opportunities foreclosed by representation.
5. Customary fee for similar work in community.
6. Whether fee is fixed or contingent.
7. Time limitations imposed by client or circumstances.
8. Amount of money involved and the results obtained.
9. Experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys.
10. "Undesirability" of the case.
11. Nature of professional relationship with the client.
12. Awards in similar cases.
488 F.2d at 717-19.
34. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
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hours, as determined by the trial judge, to prosecute a similar action.35
The Supreme Court, in a series of decisions,36 fused the two methods
by (1) using the Johnson factors to determine a market hourly rate for
the prevailing attorney, (2) multiplying that rate by a reasonable number
of hours for prosecution of the action to establish the lodestar, and (3)
subsequently adjusting the lodestar up or down if a Johnson factor was
not adequately reflected in the market hourly rate.37 Generally, courts
presume the lodestar to be the appropriate and reasonable base fee,38 and
adjustments are made only in rare or exceptional circumstances. 39 Con-
sequently, the determination of the prevailing attorney's market hourly
rate is of crucial importance in the fee calculation.
Because this Note seeks to redefine the calculus for a prevailing at-
torney's market hourly rate, the mechanics used to arrive at such a rate
in the current hybrid system must first be explained. Defining the rele-
vant legal market presents the first challenge to arriving at an appropri-
ate market hourly rate. As the Court stated in Blum v. Stenson, the type
of legal service provided and the community in which that service is pro-
vided determines the proper market.40 Currently, district courts must
evaluate and balance the Johnson factors that relate to the community or
type of service involved. For example, attorney representation in a sim-
ple freedom of speech claim in Jackson, Mississippi delineates a legal
market completely different from that defined by attorney representation
in a complex employment discrimination case in Washington, D.C.4 1
Having isolated the proper legal market, the court then must find a
"prevailing" rate for a lawyer of "reasonably comparable skill, experi-
ence and reputation" in that market.4 2 The prevailing attorney's custom-
ary hourly billing rate is not determinative;43 instead, the court evaluates
the Johnson factors that bear on the attorney's skill, experience, and rep-
utation. Although this approach is convoluted, its simple purpose is to
direct lower courts to decide on a fair price (the market rate) for a good
35. See Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 242-46 (1985)
(explanation of lodestar method and discussion of its acceptance).
36. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 944-45 (1989); Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at
717-724; Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 561-68; Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896-97 (1984);
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).
37. See Blanchard, 109 S. Ct. at 945; Leading Cases: Attorneys' Fees, 101 HARV. L. REV. 290,
291 (1987); Note, supra note 29, at 472-73.
38. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 897.
39. See Delaware Valley 1, 483 U.S. at 715-17 (enumerating circumstances).
40. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895-96 n.11.
41. Obviously, billing rates vary drastically between large, urban settings and more rural set-
tings. Also, billing rates tend to vary with the complexity of the task.
42. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895-96 n.l1.
43. Id. (public interest attorney may be credited with prevailing market billing rate).
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(the attorney of a particular skill) in a unique market (the type of legal
work and community).
The Blum Court expanded the scope of the hybrid approach when it
held that the prevailing market rate should be used to calculate an award
even when the party is represented by a nonprofit legal service organiza-
tion.44 The Court rejected the argument that using the market rate
would bestow a "windfall on a nonprofit organization. '45 In applying
the prevailing market rate to nonprofit legal services, the Court noted
Congress's implicit approval of the market rate approach and Congress's
failure to distinguish among different types of attorneys.46
Presently, reasonable fee jurisprudence is a combination of the John-
son factors and the lodestar method, and it warrants most of the criticism
and controversy showered upon it. The current law has been criticized
for being too subjective (thus producing inconsistent results),4 7 causing
an enormous increase in litigation,4 8 and creating a disincentive for early
44. Id. at 895.
45. The Senate and House reports, as well as the debates on the floors of the Senate and House,
all indicate that Congress was concerned that section 1988 would become a "bonanza to the legal
profession." 122 CONG. REC. 31,473 (1976) (statement of Sen. Allen). Congress therefore empha-
sized that "reasonable" attorney's fees should not be construed to provide windfalls for attorneys.
See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 26, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at
5913; H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 26, at 9.
46. Blum, 465 U.S. at 893-95.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en bane in Save
Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988), recently reexamined the
liberal use of attorney billing histories to establish market rates. In Cumberland Mountains, the
D.C. Circuit vacated an earlier panel decision holding that when a private, profit-oriented firm repre-
sents a party at a discount hourly rate for similar work, the reduced rate is presumptively the appro-
priate rate. 826 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Judge Bork, writing for the panel, reasoned that because
the attorney for Save Our Cumberland Mountains agreed to represent the organization for a reduced
rate, the reduced rate must have been adequate to attract competent counsel to similar cases, thus
satisfying congressional intent. Id. at 49. Judge Sentelle, writing for a majority of the en bane court,
reversed the panel and, relying heavily on Blum, held that the prevailing market rate approach
applied not only to traditional profit-oriented firms and non-profit organizations, but also to re-
duced-rate private firms. Cumberland Mountains, 857 F.2d at 1524. In dissent, Judge Starr at-
tempted to flesh out Judge Bork's unconvincing reasoning in the panel opinion by arguing that a
customary (reduced) billing rate is presumptively the product of market forces (the implication being
that the reduced rate must then be adequate to attract competent counsel in general). Id. at 1530
(Starr, J., dissenting).
47. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF AiTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 7, at 27-30 (finding lack of
meaningful judicial standards and recommending congressionally imposed fee cap of $75 per hour);
Breger, Compensation Formulas for Court Awarded Attorney Fees, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Win-
ter 1984, at 249, 266 (discussing Supreme Court's previously adopted awkward position that a rea-
sonable rate depends on the prevailing market rate in a community, while at the same time
recognizing that in the traditional sense there is no prevailing market rate for the service of lawyers
in a community).
48. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, supra note 35, at 246 (present fee-setting process magni-
fies the proceedings and "increases the workload of an already overtaxed judicial system"); see also
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settlement of cases.49 But the most relevant criticism for purposes of this
Note is that the prevailing market approach tends to value highly certain
types of attorneys, such as antitrust attorneys seeking fees under the
Clayton Act, and undervalue other types of attorneys, such as civil rights
attorneys seeking awards under section 1988.50 As will be discussed be-
low, 5 1 the courts' failure or unwillingness to approach the definition of a
reasonable fee from a public goods perspective inevitably produces such
an anomolous valuation of attorney time.
II. THE GENERAL THEORY OF PUBLIC GOODS
The proposition that the enforcement of civil rights is a public good
requires a review of the general economic theory of public goods and
local public goods.5 2 The body of writing on public goods, although ex-
tensive and well developed, is far from consistent. 53 Nevertheless, this
Note will present basic principles upon which most economists agree.
A. Definition of Public Goods
A practical approach to public goods developed through legislation
long before the appearance of a generalized theory in economic litera-
ture.5 4 In 1572, the British Parliament responded to the "horryble
Murders Theft and other greate Outrag" caused by the increasing
number of vagabonds and beggars by enacting the first law designed to
Cumberland Mountains, 857 F.2d at 1525 (noting that the litigation over attorneys fees started in
1985 and lasted over three years).
49. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, supra note 35, at 248 (emphasis on hours worked may
leave little incentive to settle early).
50. See id. at 248-49 (Lindy process may disadvantage public interest bar).
51. See infra notes 73-109 and accompanying text (discussing problem of hidden public de-
mand for civil rights enforcement).
52. See infra notes 98-100 (discussing local public goods).
53. See, eg., Buchanan, Public Goods in Theory and Practice: A Note on the Minasian-Samuel-
son Discussion, 10 J.L. & ECON. 193 (1967) (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of privately
supplied and publicly supplied television signals); Minasian, Public Goods in Theory and Practice
Revisited, 10 J.L. & ECON. 205 (1967) (same); Samuelson, Pitfalls in the Analysis of Public Goods, 10
J.L. & ECON. 199 (1967) (same).
54. In early England, manorial communities required a certain amount of common land on
which animals could pasture. Without such common pastures, the agricultural production of the
manor would suffer. See N. HONE, THE MANOR AND MANORIAL RECORDS 110-11 (1906). Appar-
ently, private individuals could not provide the land. In response, the "lord's waste" was open to all
tenants' animals for pasture. Id. The fact that in some townships only animals that had wintered in
the manor were allowed to graze on the commons, see P. VINOGRADOFF, VILLAINAGE IN ENGLAND
262 (1892), demonstrates that the commons served the economic interest of the manor rather than
any humane interest in the cattle's welfare. The commons provides a historical example of a good
that theoretically could be provided privately, but realistically could be provided more efficiently by
collective action. See A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITz, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 483-84
(1980).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
give relief to the poor through compulsory taxation and redistribution."
The Parliament made it clear that the relief was not given for purely
altruistic reasons, but primarily for the purpose of mitigating the "great
annoye of the Comon Weale. '' 56 Seventy years later, the people of Mas-
sachusetts determined that the minister's house in each town should be
subsidized by a public charge on all inhabitants of the town.57 The peo-
ple presumably imposed this tax not for the benefit of the ministers alone,
but for the happiness of the colony as a whole.5 8
These examples, along with the commonly used example of national
defense, illustrate what central governments for centuries have recog-
nized: that many types of valuable and necessary goods would remain
underprovided by the free market.5 9 Nevertheless a general definition of
the type of good that requires public provision remained elusive until
Sidgwick's and Pigou's works in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.60 Sidgwick and Pigou made crucial contributions to the work
of Adam Smith6' by introducing and analyzing the concept of the "free
55. An Acte for the Punishement of Vacabondes, and for Releifof the Poore & Impotent, 1572,
14 Eliz., ch. 5, §§ 1, 16. See generally 3 E. LIPSON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND 416-18
(4th ed. 1947) (discussing the development of English poor laws).
56. 14 Eliz., ch. 5, at § 1. See generally G.B. SHAW, MAJOR BARBARA 142 (1960) ("Only fools
fear crime: we all fear poverty.").
57. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAUUES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS
OF THE MASSACHUSETS § 16 (1648).
For other early examples of this type of collective action, see MASS. CONT. pt. 1, art. III (1853)
(empowering legislature to compel provision of public worship for the "happiness" of all people); An
Act to Supply Some Defects in the Laws for Repairing and Rebuilding County Bridges, for Repair-
ing, Enlarging, Erecting, and Providing Houses of Correction, and for Passing Rogues and
Vagabonds, 1741, 14 Geo. 2, ch. 33; An Act for Erecting of Pounds in Each Township of this
Province, ch. 301, § 5, 1729 Pa. Acts 221, 224 (public provision of animal pounds); Act of Mar. 5,
1624, § 15, 1623-1624 Va. Laws & Orders 421, 425 (public provision of grainery).
58. See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. III (1853).
59. See Pearce, Justifiable Government Intervention in Preserving the Quality of Life, in PUBLIC
ECONOMICS AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 125, 125-26 (L. Wingo & A. Evans eds. 1977).
60. See A. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183-88 (4th ed. 1932); A. PIGou, A STUDY
IN PUBLIC FINANCE 118-20 (1929); H. SIDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 406
(3d ed. 1901) (fathering the now-famous lighthouse example).
61. Adam Smith, certainly not one of history's leading welfare economists, acknowledged the
existence of certain market failures. Smith concluded that three basic types of goods require public
provision: (1) national defense, (2) the administration of justice, and (3) public works and institu-
tions. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
653-766 (E. Cannan ed. 1937); see also Buchanan, Public Goods and Natural Liberty, in THE MAR-
KET AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADAM SMITH 271 (T. Wilson & A. Skinner eds.
1976) (discussing Smith's analysis of collective provision of goods); Musgrave, Adam Smith on Pub.
lic Finance and Distribution, in THE MARKET AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADAM
SMITH, supra, at 296 (Smith's views a "fore-runner to the modem theory of social goods"). Smith's
insightful analysis did little, however, to provide a generalized definition of a public good.
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rider" as an essential element of the definition of public goods. 62 Accord-
ing to Sidgwick and Pigou, a good must be publicly provided when it can
be consumed by persons from whom payment cannot be exacted. 63
Otherwise, free riders can consume goods at little or no cost to them-
selves and destroy the incentives for private provision.
Paul Samuelson helped give structure to the previously amorphous
concept of public goods in his series of articles on the theory of public
expenditure. 64 Samuelson posited that a public good exhibits two essen-
tial characteristics: (1) no member of a community in which the good is
produced can be prevented from consuming or enjoying the good (the
free-rider problem), and (2) each member's consumption of the good,
once provided, does not subtract from the supply available for other
members' consumption.65 The former characteristic is often called
"nonexcludability" while the latter condition is referred to as jointness of
supply, or "nonrivalrousness. ' '66
Although Samuelson's definition of a pure public good remains
widely accepted, it fails to address the vast majority of goods that share
characteristics of both purely private and purely public goods.67 For ex-
ample, a public bridge can be established as nonexcludable, but at some
point it becomes congested with patrons; consequently it exhibits a cer-
tain amount of rivalrousness. Although such a good does not fit pre-
cisely into Samuelson's analysis, recent developments in the area indicate
62. A "free-rider" is one who consumes valuable goods at little or no expense to himself.
Nontaxpayers, for example, are free-riders with respect to the protection they receive from police or
fire departments.
63. See A. PIGOU, supra note 60, at 183-84; H. SIDGWICK, supra note 60, at 406 (cost of
lighthouses cannot be practically apportioned among those enjoying beneficial effects).
64. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 332
(1958) [hereinafter Samuelson, Aspects]; Samuelson, Diagrammatic Explanation of a Theory of Pub-
lic Expenditure, 37 REV. EcON. & STATISTICS 350 (1955) [hereinafter Samuelson, Diagrammatic
Explanation]; Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECoN. & STATISTICS 387
(1954) [hereinafter Samuelson, Pure Theory].
65. See Samuelson, Diagrammatic Explanation, supra note 64, at 350; Samuelson, Pure Theory,
supra note 64, at 387. Samuelson's definition, although occasionally criticized for its failure to con-
sider mixed goods (i.e., goods that are only partially nonexludable or jointly supplied, such as a
public museum), see R. BENJAMIN, THE LIMITs OF POLITICS 10 (1980), has been almost universally
accepted as the proper definition of a pure public good. See, eg., id. at 9-11; J. HENDERSON & R.
QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 298 (3d ed. 1980); P. Jo-
HANSSON, THE ECONOMIC THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS 72
(1987); E. MORGAN & A. MORGAN, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 70-71 (1972).
66. See D. STARRETT, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 42-44 (1988).
67. See R. BENJAMIN, supra note 65, at 10 ("[fln between the analytical poles of 'pure' public
and 'pure' private goods are ... goods that are called quasi-public or quasi-private or are considered
not exclusively private and thus collective in nature.").
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that Samuelson's theory must be modified only slightly to accommodate
such mixed goods.68
B. The Provision of Public Goods
Samuelson's theory of public goods departs from the Pigovian tradi-
tion of focusing on the proper level of taxation to supply the needed level
of goods. Instead, Samuelson's approach to public economics is rooted
in public expenditures 69 and the use of individual consumers' utility
functions, 70 aggregated across society, to determine the efficient level at
which public goods should be provided. Samuelson and his followers
have achieved only limited success in deriving individual utility functions
for public goods. 71 Part of the problem lies with continually changing
consumer preferences over time.72
The larger problem that Samuelson and countless others have faced
stems from the unavoidable fact that, because public goods are nonex-
cludable, consumers of such goods have no incentive to accurately reflect
their demand for the goods.7 3 A natural tendency exists for a consumer
to mask his true desire to purchase public goods if the cost of such
projects is already borne in large part by others. Users of a public bridge,
for example, although deriving a certain amount of utility from each use,
will in fact misrepresent their marginal utility74 if allowed to use the
bridge without paying. Strategic (and predictable) behavior on the part
of consumers of public goods will lead to significant underprovision
68. See R. CORNES & T. SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND
CLUB GOODS 124-28 (1986) (providing analysis of mixed goods); J. DAVIS & J. HULETr, AN ANAL-
YSIS OF MARKET FAILURE: EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND MIXED GOODS 46-47 (1977)
(same); D. STARRETT, supra note 69, at 44-47 (same).
69. See Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 64, at 332.
70. Utility is simply psychological satisfaction. See, eg. R. LIPSEY, P. STEINER & D. PURVIS,
ECONOMICS 129 (8th ed. 1987). A utility function is a linear function that traces the level of enjoy-
ment a consumer derives from consuming certain quantities of a good.
Throughout this Note, all utility functions will involve two variables: the quantity of public
goods and the quantity of private goods. Also, throughout this Note, the utility functions arc as-
sumed to be continuous and to have strictly positive partial derivatives, which implies that more of
the good under investigation is always better than less.
71. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
72. See, eg., E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY & APPLICATIONS 73 (4th ed. 1982)
(consumer preferences can vary with increasing age and education).
73. See J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 51-52 (5th ed. 1973) (once people realize public goods are available, there is no incentive to
reveal their true preferences).
74. Marginal utility refers to the additional incremental utility enjoyed by the consumer from
the consumption of one more unit of a good (in this case, trips across the bridge), Although a
consumer will value twenty trips across the bridge more than nineteen, it is likely that her enjoyment
from the additional, i.e., marginal, trip will wane if offered twenty-one trips and then twenty-two.
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because the consumers' marginal utility derived from additional units of
public goods will remain understated. 75
Samuelson resolved this dilemma by assuming the existence of
something akin to an omniscient central planner privy to each individ-
ual's preference for private and public goods.76 With this hidden infor-
mation at her disposal, the planner can sum the individual marginal
utilities across society with respect to both public and private goods. Di-
viding individuals' summed marginal utilities yields a "marginal rate of
substitution" (MRS) between the public and private good. The MRS is
the rate at which society is willing to substitute one good for the other
while maintaining a constant level of utility. For example, society may
be indifferent between (i.e., derive the same utility from) an article of
clothing worth fifty dollars and twenty trips across a new public bridge.
The central planner subsequently calculates the "rate of product
transformation" (RPT), or the rate at which one good must be sacrificed,
due to society's physical constraints of production, to produce one more
of the other good, holding all factors of production constant. The point
at which the society's MRS equals its RPT reveals to the central planner
the proper mix of public and private goods given a constant constraint on
the factors of production. 77 Such a mix achieves the goal of Pareto effi-
ciency.78 With this allocation between public and private goods: the
75. See E. CLARKE, DEMAND REVELATION AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS 45-46
(1980) (noting that if people are taxed in proportion to the benefit they claim for a public good, then
it is in their interest to claim almost no benefit); Lee, Discrimination and Efficiency in the Pricing of
Public Goods, 20 J.L. & ECON. 403, 403 (1977) ("Since each consumer can benefit from the public
good that someone else pays for, the prevailing sentiment is to pretend no desire for the good and
hope for a free ride."); van de Kragt, Orbell & Dawes, The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to
Public Goods Problems, 77 AM. POL. SCt. REV. 112, 112 (1983) (rational and selfish individuals will
recognize opportunity to "free ride" on contributions from others, knowing they can share in good
once provided, and therefore will withhold or curtail contributions).
76. Samuelson never expressly adopts the model of an omniscient central planner, but it is
implicit in his discussion. See J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 73, at 52-54 (assumption
that there is an omniscient planner who knows individual preferences for public and private goods).
77. This equilibrium condition between society's MRS and RPT is the second of Samuelson's
three optimal conditions. See Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 64, at 387, 388. This condition is
stated as: Sum(individual MRS) = RPT. The first condition deals only with private goods. Id.
The third is not relevant at this point. For other similar mathematical derivations, see J. DAVIS & J.
HULETr, supra note 68, at 35 (equations 3.10 and 3.11); 3. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, supra note
65, at 299-300 (equation 11-24).
78. A Pareto-efficient allocation is the allocation of private goods and public goods that leads to
the highest attainable level of utility for a society, given current production restraints. Pareto effi-
ciency requires that no individual's utility can be increased without decreasing another individual's
utility. The definition of Pareto efficiency is distinguishable from a concept that is often confused
with Pareto efficiency: wealth maximization. Wealth maximization focuses solely on the sum of
individuals' wealth, while Pareto efficiency focuses on individual utility. See Dworkin, Is Wealth a
Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 192-94 (1980). Judge Posner makes the following clarification:
[Tihe wealth of society is the aggregate satisfaction of those preferences... that are backed up by
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marginal utility derived from adding the last unit of the public good
equals the marginal cost of producing the good: the system is in equilib-
rium. Society's welfare therefore cannot be increased by any further
shifting of resources.
As noted earlier, Samuelson's approach only partially succeeds in
developing a workable model. Surely, by shifting responsibility for the
provision of public goods to central planners, the problem of exacting
payments from consumers is resolved. 79 However, one could argue that
the problem is merely avoided rather than resolved: Samuelson's central
planner still cannot exact true preferences from free-riding consumers.
Thus, the planner cannot derive individual or societal utility functions,
and the solution becomes only a theoretical one.8 0 Samuelson himself
admitted that a final solution would require a departure from pure eco-
nomics into the realm of sociology and welfare politics.8"
In response to this gap in Samuelson's theory, much of the recent
public goods literature has focused on theoretical and empirical methods
to elicit true consumer preferences for public goods.8 2 The continuing
inability to cure the hidden demand problem will resurface later in this
Note, when the proper method of enforcing civil rights is discussed.
III. Is THE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS A PUBLIC GOOD?
The end of the institution, maintenance, and administration of govern-
ment, is to secure the existence of the body politic, to protect it, and to
furnish the individuals who compose it with the power of enjoying in
safety and tranquility their natural rights .... 83
money, that is, that are registered in a market." R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 61 (1983)
(emphasis added). Thus, while Vilfredo Pareto would take into account all individuals' utility func-
tions, a wealth maximizer considers only those utility functions that, with the backing of money, are
reflected in the marketplace. Id. at 60-61.
79. This assumes that the planner has the power to tax.
80. J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 73, at 53-54 (people will not state true preference
as long as tax payments depend on their preferences; therefore any solution analogous to the market
is unsatisfactory); see also E. MORGAN & A. MORGAN, supra note 65, at 73-74 (neither a market
decision nor a political decision is likely to produce ideal result, since market decision leads to under-
provision because of difficulty of collecting payment, and joint nature of public goods causes a polit-
ical solution to lead to underprovision as well).
81. Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 64, at 389.
82. See, e.g., K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 9-19 (2d ed. 1963); A.
ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 513-15 (1980); E. CLARKE, supra
note 75, at 71-102 (discussing the incentive tax method of demand revelation); R. CORNES & T.
SANDLER, supra note 68, at 102-12; J. HEAD, PUBLIC GOODS AND PUBLIC WELFARE 86-91 (1974);
Brookshire & Coursey, Measuring the Value of a Public Good: An Empirical Comparison of Elicita-
tion Procedures, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 554, 554-57 (1987); Buchanan, From Private Preference to
Public Philosophy: The Development of Public Choice, in THE ECONOMICS OF POLITICS 8-10 (1978).
83. MASS. CONST. preamble (emphasis added).
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To determine whether the enforcement of civil rights can be charac-
terized, and thus analyzed, as a public good, this part will address, in
relation to civil rights enforcement, basic characteristics of a public good:
nonexcludability and nonrivalrousness. This part also will explore the
problem of privately supplied public goods in this context.
Before proceeding, however, a definitional clarification should be
made. Civil rights cases, for the most part, involve attorneys who agree
to represent clients for reduced fees, or no fee at all. In such cases, the
attorney essentially enters into a partnership with the client by assuming
the financial risk of success and by deriving a significant, if not complete,
portion of his remuneration from the fee award. The attorney's interests
in prevailing in the case essentially match those of the client. Conse-
quently, the client and the civil rights attorney are both consumers of
civil rights enforcement as a public good. Thus, references to "consum-
ers" of such a public good include necessarily attorneys and clients.
A. Nonexcludability
Significantly, Adam Smith in his landmark Wealth of Nations in-
cluded within his three duties of the sovereign the duty of providing "jus-
tice."' 84 Although Smith refrained from theoretical discussions of why
his thiee types of public goods should be publicly provided, his writing
on the supply of justice reflects an awareness of something similar to the
modern concept of nonexcludability:
It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that
valuable property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, or
perhaps of many successive generations, can sleep a single night in se-
curity. He is at all times surrounded by unknown enemies, whom,
though he never provoked, he can never appease, and from whose in-
justice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magis-
trate continually held up to chastise it.85
Smith recognized that justice confers upon all owners of valuable prop-
erty the benefit of physical security and peace of mind. Even those prop-
erty owners who, in the absence of publicly provided justice, would not
have suffered an invasion of their possessions receive a protective benefit.
Certainly no feasible method of exacting payment to reflect the quantum
of protective benefit received can be devised. Consequently, Smith prob-
ably would conclude today that the provision of justice is not
excludable. 86
84. A. SMITH, supra note 61, at 669-81 (second duty of sovereign is "protecting as far as possi-
ble, every member of society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it").
85. A. SMITH, supra note 61, at 670.
86. See Buchanan, supra note 61, at 275 (noting that the provision of justice, as envisioned by
Smith, "enter[s] the utility functions of individuals, . . .and . . . must be (or should be) made
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Although one might construe Smith's eighteenth-century concept of
justice as protecting the "haves" from the "have-nots," his analysis can
easily extend to the enforcement of a citizen's civil rights. It is a funda-
mental tenet of civil rights doctrine that civil rights enforcement as to
one person or class of persons inures to the benefit of all citizens.87 This
societal benefit may take one of three forms. First, when the civil rights
of one person are protected, other members of the society receive a
psychic benefit of security in knowing that their civil rights also will be
protected, if necessary.88 Second, there is a direct, physical benefit which
inures to the class of people protected by civil rights enforcement. For
example, when a city ordinance infringes its employees' rights of free
speech, an injunction against the city benefits not only those employees
who bring suit, but also all other city employees and all other govern-
ment employees similarly situated.89 Third, civil rights enforcement en-
hances society's quality of life. This is the positive spillover benefit
received from another individual's exercise of her civil rights. For exam-
ple, all society derives economic benefit from the employment of highly
generally available to all members of the community") (emphasis added). Buchanan concludes that
Smith's provision of justice, or laws, as Buchanan calls it, "embodies polar or extreme publicness"
and "is wholly consistent with modem public goods analysis." Id. at 276-77.
87. See 122 CONG. REc. 33,313 (1976) (statement of Sen. Tunney) (When a citizen teeks to
enforce his civil rights and the right "he seeks to assert and vindicate goes unvindicated ... the entire
Nation, not just the individual citizen suffers.").
88. A finding of this type of broad societal benefit follows from the many cases in which courts
were asked to determine if a successful civil rights action created a private or public benefit. See,
eg., Wheatley v. Ford, 679 F.2d 1037, 1040 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Yet, actions [for unlawful arrest and
excessive use of force] which deter police overreaching benefit society as a whole."); Fox v. Parker,
626 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1980) ("Certainly, the vindication of an individual's civil rights inures to
the benefit of all citizens."); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219, 220 (1st Cir. 1974) ("the public, as well as
all present and future prisoners, benefits when the constitutionality of the treatment of prisoners is
assured").
Congress, when it enacted section 1988, surely was aware of the public's security benefit derived
from enforcing civil rights laws. See, eg., 122 CONG. REc. 35,127 (1976) ("[Ihe person who brings
such a case functions as a 'private attorney general' and acts not only for himself but also to enforce
our laws.") (statement of Rep. Holtzman). While debating the passage of what eventually became
sections 1983, 1985, and 1986 of title 42, Congressman Lowe forcefully articulated the security
benefit argument:
[I]f the rights of citizenship may be denied without redress, if the Constitution may not be
enforced .... then, indeed, is our civil Government a failure, and instead of enjoying liberty
regulated by law, its subjects may live only by the sufferance of lawless and exasperated
conspirators.
CONG. GLOBE pt. 4, at 374 (1871) (statement of Rep. Lowe) (debating Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22,
17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1982))).
89. Cf Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1202-04 (8th Cir. 1981) (requiring employer to hire at
least one black person for every two white persons employed). See generally Newman v. Piggie Park
Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) ("If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but
also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority."), cited in S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 26, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 5910.
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qualified minorities or the societal benefit derived from affirmative action
in college admissions,90 or the cultural benefit derived from the expan-
sion of the marketplace of free speech.91
A shared trait binding all three types of benefits is the lack of a
feasible method for exacting payments from those individuals who enjoy
the benefits. When individuals freely consume without expense, the free-
rider effect prompts such consumers to understate their true benefit, thus
leading to an underprovision of the good.9Z Thus, civil rights enforce-
ment exhibits the characteristic of nonexcludability, and appears, thus
far, to be a classic example of a pure public good.
B. Nonrivalrousness
A public good exhibits not only nonexcludability, but also
nonrivalrousness, or nondiminishing joint supply. 93 Therefore, civil
rights enforcement constitutes a public good only if one citizen's con-
sumption of that enforcement does not reduce the supply of enforcement
available to all other citizens. Significantly, excess demand for a public
good does not necessarily imply that the public good is not jointly sup-
plied. Joint supply means only that once a public good is supplied, it can
be enjoyed by all;94 that is to say the opportunity cost to the marginal
user of the good is zero. 95
The demand for civil rights enforcement may exceed its supply, 96
90. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-14 (1978) (Powell, J.) (discuss-
ing benefits to universities from increased diversity).
91. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2547 (1989) ("The way to preserve the flag's special
role is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that they
are wrong."); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas"); H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH 49 (1968) ("Free speech plays its most important role in the political discussions and argu-
ments which are the lifeblood of any representative democracy.").
92. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
93. To illustrate the concept of "joint supply," suppose the government of Washington, D.C.
enacts various regulations that restrict certain types of expression by district employees. Suppose
also the number of district employees wanting to challenge these restrictions far surpasses both the
number of attorneys willing to handle such matters and the resources of district courts. If, however,
several plaintiffs retain lawyers and successfully obtain injunctions against the district government,
all district employees will benefit. Thus, demand initially exceeds supply of civil rights enforcement,
but once supplied, the enforced civil right necessarily is supplied to all other employees.
94. E. MORGAN & A. MORGAN, supra note 65, at 71.
95. See D. STARRETT, supra note 66, at 43-44.
Opportunity cost refers to the value of the next best alternative use of one's resources. For
example, the opportunity cost of one hour of leisure equals the value of one hour of work, or the
opportunity cost of buying a car is the value that a consumer places on the other things she could do
with the car's purchase price. If the opportunity cost of a good is zero, then the consumer can
consume the good for "free"; i.e., she has to give nothing of value in order to consume the good.
96. See supra note 93.
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but once a particular right is enforced, one person's enjoyment of that
enforced right does not diminish any other person's ability to enjoy that
right. An injunction, for example, is not a wasting asset and is not sub-
ject to congestion like the public bridge previously discussed. Similarly,
the deterrent effect of damages does not progressively diminish each time
a person enjoys that deterrent effect. Thus, once a civil right is enforced
for one person, the enforced right necessarily can be enjoyed by all
people.
C. Private Provision of Civil Rights
Although the provision of civil rights satisfies the traditional defini-
tion of public goods, one could argue that Congress has not treated such
provision as a public good, since section 1988 (and all other fee-shifting
statutes) requires private parties, as well as public parties, to pay fee
awards.
If the government subsidized all fee awards paid by private defend-
ants under section 1988, then public goods analysis would easily apply.
But if just private parties are involved, fee shifting alters only the rela-
tionship between the parties and is not amenable to traditional public
goods analysis. For example, when a private employer has discriminated
in hiring practices, the employer, not the government, pays the plaintiff's
attorney's fees.97
This argument, however, fails to consider that entities smaller than
the central government can provide public goods. An entity provides a
local public good when the benefits of the good affect a relatively small
jurisdiction, such as a municipality. 98 Frequently, the jurisdiction for ex-
acting payment for the public good is even smaller than the jurisdiction
that receives benefits from the good.99 For example, suppose Employer is
a regional power company that discriminates in its hiring practices. As
discussed above, the benefits from a ruling against Employer accrue to all
citizens; but the Employer can exact payments through higher prices
only from its regional customers. Thus, the benefits provided by Em-
ployer "spill over" beyond its economic jurisdiction. 1°
97. See, eg., Allen v. Terminal Transp. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1195, 1201-02 (N.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd
sumn, sub nom. United States v. Terminal Transp. Co., 653 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1881), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 989 (1982).
98. See R. CORNES & T. SANDLER, supra note 68, at 24 (describing local public goods as
including city parks, roadways, museums, and tennis courts).
99. Id.
100. See id. ("[W]hen a public good confers benefits outside the political jurisdiction that pro-
vides it and no compensation is paid by these outside recipients, spillovers of benefits exist.")
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Such a complication, however, is not fatal to this Note's analysis.
Under local public goods analysis, the method of determining an equilib-
rium level of public goods by each local entity differs from the traditional
Samuelsonian approach.10 ' Indeed, the equilibrium obtained under the
local approach is not the Pareto-efficient provision of goods, since con-
sumers within each entity's jurisdiction take advantage of free-rider op-
portunities by consuming benefits provided across economic
jurisdictions. Thus, the equilibrium reached locally will result in the un-
derprovision of the good because of hidden demand.10 2 Although the
analysis of local public goods differs from the analysis of public goods
provided by the national government, the problem is the same-the free-
rider problem, which is caused by a failure of the market to reveal true
consumer preferences. 10 3 Since this Note proposes a solution that fo-
cuses on correcting the problem of demand revelation, the analysis used
in this Note applies to public-goods provided not only by national enti-
ties, but also by local, state and regional entities.l°4
D. Civil Rights Enforcement as a Public Good
Civil rights enforcement by local and national entities satisfies the
two-part definition of public goods accepted in most public goods litera-
ture. Consequently, one would expect to find evidence that civil rights
are under-enforced if provided by the private market. Courts, 0 5 Con-
gress,10 6 and scholars'0 7 all agree that if left to private enforcement, civil
101. See id. at 18-22 (entities react to other entities' provision until an equilibrium is reached).-
102. See id. at 24.
103. See id.
104. For simplicity, this Note will frequently refer to the "government" as the supplier of a
public good. The use of that term is intended to refer to both the national and state governments as
well as local, private suppliers of public goods.
105. See, ag., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) ("[I]f successful plain-
tiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a
position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts.");
Wheatley v. Ford, 679 F.2d 1037, 1040 (2d Cir. 1982) (court should consider whether similarly
situated plaintiffs would be deterred from bringing civil rights' action absent the likelihood of an
award for attorney's fees in action for unlawful arrest and excessive use of force).
106. See, eg., 122 CONG. REC. 31,471 (1976) (statement of Sen. Scott) ("Congress must insure
that [citizens] have the means to go to court and to be effective once they get there"); id. at 33,313
(statement of Sen. Tunney) ("When Congress calls upon citizens.., to go to court to vindicate its
policies and benefit the entire Nation[,] Congress must also ensure that they have the means to go to
court, and to be effective once they get there."); id. at 33,314 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting
necessity of congressional action in enforcing civil rights).
107. See, eg., Percival & Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest Litigation,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 233, 234-41 (discussing all public interest activities,
including civil rights enforcement); Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 187, 199 (noting that more than personal benefit alone
justifies vindication through civil rights litigation); Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights
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rights will likely be significantly under-enforced. The evidence in a soci-
ety that only partially subsidizes civil rights enforcement supports the
theoretical fears of under-enforcement. 08
This conclusion should not be surprising. While no citizen can be
excluded from the benefits of a privately enforced civil right, public
goods theory predicts that citizens will free-ride on the benefits provided
by others. As noted earlier,109 the free-rider problem leads to under-
provision of privately supplied public goods; consequently, private en-
forcement of civil rights will never reach a Pareto-efficient level.
Collective action, whether by local or national entities, therefore
becomes necessary to prevent civil rights laws from becoming "mere
hollow pronouncements."'" 0 To the extent that this Note has demon-
strated civil rights enforcement to be a public good, the "reasonable fee"
requirement of section 1988 can be calculated from a traditional public
goods perspective, with an eye toward constructing a definition leading
to a Pareto-efficient level of enforcement.
IV. THE OPTIMAL FEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
This part will design a method of determining a "reasonable" attor-
ney's fee under section 1988 by using public goods analysis, eventually
showing that the fee should incorporate the attorney's opportunity costs
of representing the civil rights plaintiff. As discussed earlier,", decen-
tralized pricing systems fail to supply society's optimal amount of public
goods;" 2 therefore, some central authority (here, presumably a court)
must calculate a fee that will lead to the optimal provision of civil rights
enforcement.' 13 However, to construct such a fee, one must be sensitive
to the economic forces that keep a decentralized price system from pro-
Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 349 (1980) (same). See generally
Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants
as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247 (1988) (discussing need for private attorneys
general when party represents more interests than just his own).
108. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. Although the sources conflict, the weight of
authority supports the proposition that civil rights are currently under-enforced.
109. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
110. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 26, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5913.
111. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text,
112. See Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 64, at 388-89 (optimal levels of collective consump-
tion cannot be achieved through decentralized pricing system).
113. One solution proposed by Richard Musgrave, operating on the assumption that most public
goods are "intermediate" in nature and lead to the production of private goods, is to calculate the
market value of the private goods derived from the public good. See I R. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC
FINANCE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 62-63 (1986) (noting that better roads reduce individual auto-
motive costs and trucking time). Unfortunately, the enforcement of civil rights rarely leads to the
production of measurable private goods.
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viding the optimal level of a public good. The true obstacle to such an
outcome is the problem of demand revelation.' 1 4 Consequently, the ideal
attorney's fee is one that overcomes the problem of hidden demand with-
out creating incentives to exaggerate demand. 5 I
A. Fee Shifting as the Optimal Method for Civil Rights Enforcement
It is overstating the problem of demand revelation to conclude that
no method can be devised that measures consumer demand for a public
good with reasonable accuracy. 116 Edward Clarke proposes an analyti-
cally helpful model to elicit accurate consumer preferences. Clarke ar-
gues that voters will truthfully reveal their preferences if each voter is
convinced that her vote is the decisive vote on a project and that in no
case will she be taxed an amount greater than her stated benefits. 1 7
While Clarke's method suffers from its complexity and expense in a
large-group setting,1 8 it adds insight into the problem. If a voter knows
114. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
115. Demand will be overstated if all costs of preference revelation are removed. See D. STAR-
RET, supra note 66, at 69.
116. Eric Lindahl has argued that if two consumers bargain with each other and reach a consen-
sus on the appropriate provision of a public good, an optimal level of that good will be supplied. See
Lindahl, Just Taxation-A Positive Solution, in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 168,
168-73 (R. Musgrave & A. Peacock eds. 1967). Lindahl refined an earlier model developed by Kurt
Wicksell, which suggested that an efficient level of public goods will be supplied if a contemplated
public good project requires unanimous, or near unanimous, approval by the voting public. See
Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation, in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE,
supra, at 72, 90-94. Wicksell's theory is recognized as failing to deal with the immediate problem of
this Note--the lack of incentive for voters to vote their true preferences. See generally J. HEAD,
supra note 82, at 87-88 (discussing the model's limitations).
Although Lindahl's bargaining theory has been criticized by some as failing to elicit true de-
mand preferences from consumers, see J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 73, at 51-52, others
have found that, if the bargaining group remains sufficiently small and free discussion is allowed,
true preferences will be expressed and the good will be optimally supplied. See M. OLSEN, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53-57 (1971); van
der Kragt, Orbell & Dawes, supra note 75, at 113-14. Despite the merits of Lindahl's theory, the
theory is of only limited usefulness in the context of a public good, such as a civil rights enforcement,
which must be provided to a very large number of consumers. In large groups, the bargaining
process breaks down. See id. at 119-20 (probability of unreasonable behavior increases as group size
increases). There is also no guarantee that a large group will be able to organize into small bargain-
ing units. See J. HEAD, supra note 57, at 88 (lack of motivation to signal individual public goods
preferences cannot be overcome by "intersecting small-number agreements").
117. See E. CLARKE, supra note 75, at 72-75 (employing example of public voting on pollution
control project).
118. Clarke's model requires each voter to express in dollars their individual benefits from a
given public goods project on a ballot. The stated benefits and detriments of all other voters are
summed into "Yes/No" categories, excluding the voter under study. The stated dollar value of the
individual voter's preference is then added to the aggregate of recorded benefits. If and only if that
incremental addition causes the project to exceed the dollar votes opposing the project will the voter
be required to pay a small fixed tax plus a variable tax not to exceed the voter's stated benefit from
the project. This process must be repeated for each voter. Id.; see also Clarke, Multipart Pricing of
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her stated preference will be decisive as to whether a good is supplied,
and the voter knows that the cost of truthfully stating her preferences
will always be less than or equal to the individual benefits received from
such truthful statements, then the voter's stated demand for the public
good will be accurate.11 9
If Clarke's voter preference model is accurate, it should be clear that
prospective supply of civil rights enforcement by the federal government
is bound to be suboptimal. The performance of the Enforcement Divi-
sion of the Justice Department and the Legal Services Corporation
(LSC), two government organizations deeply involved in civil rights en-
forcement, reinforces this prediction. Even absent the political disputes
that are bound to disrupt these organizations, 120 they face the intractable
problem of calculating the public's demand for civil rights enforcement.
Because of obstacles inherent in empirical measurement, debates eter-
nally rage over the actual level of demand. 121 Consequently, the Justice
Department and the LSC face the arduous task of deciphering inaccurate
voter preferences, attempting to construct a societal demand function,
and then supplying civil rights enforcement equal to that demand. All of
Public Goods. An Example, in PUBLIC PRICES FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTS 125, 125-26 (S. Mushlein ed.
1972) (outlining this process). Obviously, in the context of a national public good, such a process
would be prohibitively expensive.
119. See E. CLARKE, supra note 75, at 73-75. For a brief mathematical exposition of Clarke's
theory, see R. CORNES & T. SANDLER, supra note 68, at 105-08.
120. See, e.g., Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1989: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 817-18 (1988) (statement of Michael Wallace, Chairman, Regulations Committee,
Legal Services Corporation) (acknowledging political battles within the LSC); Departments of Com-
merce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1988: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 306-07 (1987)
(statement of Terry Roche, Exec. Dir., Legal Services of Southern Piedmont, citing The National
Commitment to Civil Legal Services for the Poor, Legal Services Crises and Concerns, Feb. 1, 1987,
at 1, col. 2, (discussing the political battles over LSC)); UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 1957 - 1983: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS 71-76 (1983) (criticizing various executive agencies, including Justice Department, for fail-
ure to coordinate and to take an aggressive role in civil rights enforcement); Englade, The LSC
Under Siege, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1987, at 66-73 (discussing political battles over control of the LSC).
121. Compare Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 401, 401-06 (1975) (demand for public interest lawyers does not exceed supply) and
Zemans, supra note 107, at 194 (same) with Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Appropriations on H.R. 5161, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 1254-55 (statement of William
Falsgraf, President, ABA) (providing an estimated demand for public interest lawyers and showing
demand to be well in excess of supply); B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE
MEANS 21 (1970) (demand for public interest lawyers "virtually limitless"); B. CURRAN, THE
LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 262 (1977) (persons who suffer civil rights violations generally fail to
express demand for civil rights attorneys) and J. HANDLER, LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF
LEGAL RIGHTS 92-99 (1978) (discussing and presenting evidence of minuscule percentage of pro
bono hours devoted to civil rights cases).
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the previously discussed problems of eliciting true consumer preference
make the appropriate level of civil rights enforcement by these agencies
problematic, if not impossible.
The solution to the demand revelation problem for civil rights en-
forcement must combine Clarke's work on voter preferences with decen-
tralized information gathering which does not rely on an agency's
subjective determination of public preferences. 122 Fee shifting synthe-
sizes the benefits of eliciting truthful voter preferences and decentralized
information, offering a mechanism that ensures an optimal level of civil
rights enforcement desired across society.1 23
1. Decentralized Information. A scheme of decentralized infor-
mation-gathering requires the government to determine the appropriate
level of public goods supply based only on expressed and measured pub-
lic demand. But the Justice Department and LSC predict the level of
public demand for civil rights enforcement prospectively, based on limited
information. A decentralized system, in comparison, operates retrospec-
tively in response to expressed demand. Preferences are determined first,
and supply is subsequently financed. Because a decentralized informa-
tional system requires that financing follow demand calculations, public
goods are more efficiently financed after the fact by tax subsidies (or sub-
sidized through price increases) rather than through prospective direct
taxation. 124 Consequently, a decentrIalized approach to providing civil
rights enforcement can be optimally implemented only by providing a
subsidy through attorney fee shifting. Under a fee shifting regime,
government (or a firm) incurs expenses by subsidizing legal services as
they are required. Thus, the economic entity responds to, rather than
predicts, demand.
122. D. STARRETT, supra note 66, at 66 ("[A]ny individual who contracts for [public goods]
automatically confers net benefits on others .... So the private benefit from the purchase will differ
from the social benefit; unless the contractor is appropriately altrustic, the contracted level will be
incorrect from a social point of view. We seek a planning procedure that corrects for this distortion
yet is still informationally decentralized.").
123. Many commentators have written on the subject of determining whether public laws should
be enforced by a centralized public agency or by public subsidization of private, decentralized litiga-
tion. See, eg., Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 . LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1975) (in
a system where fines are awarded to private enforcers, the imposition of a higher penalty may send
the wrong signal to private profit maximizers and lead to over-enforcement); Polinsky, Private Ver-
sus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 . LEGAL STUD. 105, 124 (1980) (private competitive enforcement
leads to under-enforcement where external damage is high since it is optimal to deter most or all
individuals). Although this Note does not attempt to resolve conclusively that debate, it will show
that public subsidization of private enforcement is preferable when demand revelation is a problem.
124. See Roberts, Financing Public Goods, 95 . POL. ECON. 420, 421-25 (1987) (arguing that, in
most cases, the use of a tax subsidy is more efficient than direct taxation and provision).
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2. Correcting for Demand Revelation Distortions. Assuming that
government-financed attorney fee shifting provides an accurate method
of recording demand, the fee shifting scheme must also elicit accurate
demand. Recall from Clarke's theory that a consumer will truthfully
express his preferences if: (1) his expressions will determine whether the
public good will ultimately be provided, and (2) the cost of his expression
will always be less than or equal to the individual benefits he derives from
such accurate expression.1 25 The first condition does not depend on the
structure of the fee-shifting statute: a demand for civil rights enforce-
ment (i.e., a decision to retain a lawyer and begin litigation) will almost
always determine whether the right will be enforced. Fulfillment of the
second condition, however, does depend on the amount of the fee award.
3. Arriving at the Proper Fee. Given the economic principles of
public goods discussed above, it is now possible to calculate a "reason-
able fee" that satisfies Clarke's conditions for accurate demand revelation
for civil rights enforcement. Suppose Client retains Attorney under a pro
bono arrangement to bring a section 1983 action to challenge a city regu-
lation that allegedly infringes Client's freedom of speech. Should Client
prevail, 126 the court could enjoin the city from enforcing the regulation
while awarding Client only a nominal amount of damages, say, five dol-
lars. 127 Clearly, to satisfy Clarke's conditions in these types of low-re-
turn circumstances, the cost to the "consumer" (the litigant and his
attorney) of expressing his demand (bringing suit) must approach
zero.128 The public goods literature confirms this proposition.129
The costs involved in expressing demand (i.e., instituting litigation)
can be segregated into two components. First, the consumer faces the
risk of not prevailing and hence bearing the entire cost of bringing suit.
This cost has been the subject of much debate 30 and will not substan-
125. See E. CLARKE, supra note 75, at 73-74; Clarke, supra note 118, at 125-126; see also supra
notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the prevailing party test).
127. See, eg., Fox v. Parker, 626 F.2d 351, 352 (4th Cir. 1980) (award of five dollars),
128. Of course, the demand must reflect only legitimate civil rights claims. If the cost of expres-
sing demand for imagined or baseless rights approaches zero, then enforcement will be over-pro-
vided. See infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
129. See J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 73, at 60 (voter will express preference so
long as tax burden not dependent on expression); D. STARRETr, supra note 69, at 69 (shifting cost of
choosing to consumer leads consumer to understate demand).
130. See, eg., Leubsdorf, supra note 14 (arguing that while attorney fees should be higher when
the "plaintiff's lawyer will be paid only if his client succeeds than when he will be paid regardless of
success,... the contingency bonus should be prescribed for categories of cases and should reflect
judgment about how much encouragement each category should receive"); Rowe, The Supreme
Court on Attorney Fee Awards, 1985 and 1986 Terms: Economics, Ethics and Ex Ante Analysis, 1
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 621, 632-34 (1988) (expressing support for Professor Leubsdorf's contin-
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tially affect our discussion since this Note is concerned only with finding
a reasonable base fee. 131 Second, and most significantly, the consumer
bears the opportunity cost incurred when the attorney must forgo other
employment.1 32 Thus, to keep the cost of accurately stating demand
close to zero, the litigant not only must be protected against the risk of
loss, but, when prevailing, must also be compensated for the full cost-
the opportunity cost-of the litigation. While this approach to cost
presents a fundamental departure from Supreme Court case law, it is the
standard approach in modern economic analysis. 133
To depress the litigant's cost of accurately revealing demand for
civil rights enforcement close to zero, the fee awarded to prevailing par-
ties must compensate the prevailing attorney for the lost opportunities of
employment. Thus, when establishing the lodestar, 134 the prevailing mar-
ket rate should be set at what the attorney could have earned in the market
had the attorney not taken time to enforce her client's civil rights. Such an
approach will keep the consumer's cost of demand revelation near zero.
Furthermore, local entities and the federal government will not be re-
quired to estimate prospectively what level of supply will match demand:
attorneys, for the most part, 135 will be indifferent between enforcing civil
rights and practicing in any other field of law, and accordingly will move
freely between the fields as demanded. Because of this indifference, sup-
ply of civil rights attorneys will be virtually unrestricted. 136 Thus, with
gency fee proposal, but noting the Supreme Court's "disingenuous and tendentious use" in Delaware
Valley II of Professor Leubsdorf's analysis).
131. See supra note 16 (defining reasonable base fee).
132. This cost has been mentioned only in passing by courts: as one of the twelve Johnson
factors, see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974) (preclusion
of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case), and implicitly by Justice Bren-
nan in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 447 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part, concurring in
part) ("As nearly as possible, market standards should prevail, for that is the best way of ensuring
that competent counsel will be available to all persons with bona fide civil rights claims.").
133. When two or more products are related through their production inputs, the cost of each
product is always evaluated in terms of the amount of the other products forgone. See J. HENDER-
SON & R. QUANDT, supra note 65, at 92-94 (joint products exist whenever quanities of two or more
outputs are technically interdependent); D. SAPSFORD, LABOUR MARKET ECONOMICS 19 (1981)
(price of non-market activity to worker, or earnings forgone by using hours or non-market rather
than market activity, is opportunity cost). Thus, because antitrust representation and civil rights
representation may be produced by the same input (attorney representation), the cost of each repre-
sentation is most correctly determined with regard to the cost of the forgone representation.
134. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text (discussing lodestar/Johnson method).
135. See infra text following note 182 (discussing how the opportunity cost method will affect
the choices of different types of attorneys).
136. Although the number of new lawyers entering the marketplace each year seems to be fall-
ing, see Vernon and Zimmer, The Size and Quality of the Law School Applicant Pool: 1982-1986 and
Beyond, 1987 DUKE L.J. 204, 205, it is hard to imagine that demand for civil rights attorneys could
exceed supply when attorney's are indifferent between civil rights and other types of practices.
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adequate supply and accurate expression of public demand,1 37 civil rights
enforcement will be optimally provided. 38
4. Theory of Externalities as Verification of the Opportunity Cost
Approach. Certain market failures, called externalities, are external dis-
economies that impose a cost of producing a good on third parties. For
example, when a steel manufacturer pollutes a nearby river by dumping
its chemical waste there, it transfers much of the cost of waste disposal to
the general public. Unless a tax is imposed to force the company to pay
the cost of damages created by the pollution, it will lack market incentive
to produce a public good (a pollution-free river) since the price of steel
will not include certain real costs of production. Steel, offered at such an
artifically low price, will be oversupplied. A carefully crafted tax "inter-
nalizes" the external cost from pollution and adjusts the price of steel
appropriately. The tax shifts the cost of pollution onto the manufacturer
and away from the public. Conversely, the environmental tax is also a
mechanism to provide a public good-clean water-by eliminating the
externality of pollution. The tax must be crafted to impose the cost of
the pollution damage on the manufacturer but avoid overtaxing produc-
tion of steel so as to raise steel prices to the point at which steel would be
under-provided.
Clearly, there is an inverse relationship between externalities and
public goods. In this case, the more clean water provided through taxa-
tion, the less pollution there will be. The inverse relationship between
public goods and externalities 39 is well known.' 40 In fact, civil rights
enforcement can be analogously analyzed.
A civil fights infrigement constitutes an externality similar to envi-
ronmental pollution. The costs of civil rights violations shift to the pub-
lic in the form of restricted enjoyment of constitutional rights. This
external diseconomy can be properly removed by taxing the civil rights
violator (the government or local firm) an amount equal to the damage
caused by the violation. The appropriate civil rights tax is thus the level
that equals the amount a person, P, suffering the violation would be will-
137. Demand for civil rights enforcement will never be perfectly revealed under any scheme.
Ignorance of civil rights laws will always be a problem. If two-fifths of the population believe that
people may be rightfully restrained from expressing unpopular opinions, see H. MCCLOSKY & A.
BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES tbl.
2.1 (1983), many of those people likely would be unaware of civil rights violations.
138. See generally A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, supra note 82, at 515 (stating that a mechanism
patterned after Clarke's theory will create the dominant consumer strategy of accurate demand reve-
lation and lead to Pareto efficiency).
139. R. CORNES & T. SANDLER, supra note 68, at 29.
140. See P. JOHANSSON, supra note 65, at 72.
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ing to pay the violator to cease.1 41 P would be willing to pay no more
than the costs imposed upon himself by the violation. Most costs im-
posed upon P would fall under the category of substantive damages re-
sulting from a civil rights violation, and thus are of no concern here. But
the producer also imposes the cost of forcing P to retain an attorney, A
(P and A are collectively referred to here, as before, as the consumer) to
enforce her rights. Thus, the producer imposes upon the consumer the
cost of A's services-that is, the opportunity cost to A of devoting time to
enforcing P's civil rights. Consequently, P and A collectively would be
willing to pay the producer up to the amount of substantive harm suf-
fered by P plus the opportunity costs of A's services. Thus, the equilib-
rium tax would include A's opportunity costs. 142
Not surprisingly, the conditions for optimal production of goods
that create externalities mirror the Samuelsonian conditions for optimal
provision of public goods. 143 Following from this inverse relationship,
the equilibrium tax on an externality should equal the equilibrium price
(attorney fee) for the inverse public good. Thus, the theory of proper
taxation of externality-producing activities proves that the prevailing
market rate factored into the lodestar should reflect the attorney's oppor-
tunity cost of devoting time to such enforcement.
V. IMPLEMENTATION, JUSTIFICATION, AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE
OPPORTUNITY COST METHOD
This Note argued above that courts, in ordering a fee award under
section 1988, should establish the lodestar by setting the prevailing mar-
ket rate equal to the opportunity cost to the attorney of bringing the civil
rights action. This part will develop the opportunity cost approach fur-
ther and will determine whether such an approach is consistent with
Congress's intent in enacting section 1988. Finally, this part will analyze
the real-world implications of such a change in fee awards.
141. Pigou first developed this approach, see A. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, supra
note 60, at 183-88, but it has been substantially refined, see, e.g., Carlton & Loury, The Limitations
of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-Run Remedyfor Externalities, 95 Q.J. EcoN. 559, 564 (1980) (arguing
for additional lump sum tax); Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-6 (1982).
142. See Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. EcON. REV. June, 1972,
at 307, 311 (designing a tax to eliminate an externality and including consideration of opportunity
costs); Cooter, supra note 141, at 5.
143. R. CORNES & T. SANDLER, supra note 29, at 53 (equations 4 and 5); J. DAVIS & J. HU-
LETr, supra note 68, at 46; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the Samuelson
conditions).
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A. Implementing the Opportunity Cost Approach in Attorney Fee
Shifting
Although this Note advocates a radical departure from current at-
torney fee shifting jurisprudence, it does share with Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc. 144 and the Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel
panel opinion 145 a common mechanical approach in calculating a reason-
able fee. In both of those cases, the D.C. Circuit looked first to the attor-
ney's billing history in private representation and, if such history proved
nonexistent, then resorted to a judicially crafted market rate. 146 Imple-
menting the opportunity cost standard in attorney fee shifting requires,
however, a slightly different two-step process. Whereas Laffey requires
courts to examine the attorney's billing history for similar work, 147 the
opportunity cost approach focuses on the billing history for dissimilar
work. For example, if the attorney is normally a tax attorney, then the
opportunity cost to the attorney of accepting a civil rights case is the
amount she could have earned in her usual tax practice had she not ac-
cepted the civil rights case.
If the attorney is a full-time civil rights or public interest attorney
and has no private billing history, then a proxy must be judicially devel-
oped by constructing an opportunity-cost-based market rate. This can be
done empirically by calculating a set of market rates in a given commu-
nity, reflecting experience, education, and other professional creden-
tials. 148 Consistent with the opportunity cost approach, such a judicially
crafted market rate would be based on average rates for work other than
civil rights litigation. Of course, such a constructed fee would fail to
account for many intangible factors (whether negative or positive) for
each individual attorney, but no manageable system can accurately mea-
sure such factors in the absence of a billing history.
Admittedly, the opportunity cost method is a radical departure from
established Supreme Court caselaw. In Blum v. Stenson, the Court spe-
cifically mandated that the prevailing market rate be based upon average
rates charged for similar work.149 The Court has never backed away
144. 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled, Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel,
857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
145. Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 857
F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
146. See Cumberland Mountains, 826 F.2d at 47-50; Laffey, 746 F.2d at 16 n.74.
147. See Laffey, 746 F.2d at 18.
148. For an example of this type of fee schedule, see CourtAwarded Attorney Fees, supra note 35,
at 260 n.70. To such a schedule should probably be added factors relating to academic performance
and rates charged by comparable classmates.
149. 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 n. 11(1984); see also Save Our Cumberland Mountains, 857 F.2d at
1254 (recognizing the "similar services" requirement).
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from that approach.150 Whether such a basic shift is justified by congres-
sional intent is the subject of the next section.
B. Congressional Intent
An examination of the legislative history indicates that three con-
cerns motivated Congress to enact section 1988. First, and most impor-
tantly, Congress desired to provide full and complete enforcement of the
civil rights laws. 151 Second, because Congress viewed civil rights to be at
least as important as other statutory rights, it sought to put civil rights
enforcement on the same footing as other statutory rights subject to fee
shifting provisions.1 5 2 Finally, Congress attempted to achieve the first
two goals without granting windfalls in remuneration to civil rights at-
torneys.1 53 To that end, Congress limited fee awards to a "reasonable"
amount.
The opportunity cost approach is consistent with these goals. A
"reasonable" fee under section 1988 must reflect the opportunity cost of
competent representation in order to provide for complete enforcement
of civil rights: the opportunity cost regime helps cure the demand revela-
tion problem and ensures that supply is always adequate to meet that
demand.
Furthermore, the opportunity cost method certainly comes closer to
elevating civil rights enforcement to the same level of importance as
other statutory rights. Under the current "similar services" approach to
calculating attorney fees, 154 a civil rights fee award will be substantially
150. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989) (reaffirming the similar service
approach).
151. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 26, at 6 (fee shifting needed because civil rights laws are
not self-executing and are not to become "mere hollow pronouncements"), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5913; 122 CONG. REC. 33,313-14 (1976) (statements of Sens.
Tunney and Kennedy); see also Berger, supra note 14, at 306, 310 ("the fundamental purpose of [fee
shifting] provisions is to encourage full enforcement of the substantive rights to which they are
attached").
152. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 26, at 9 ("civil rights plaintiffs should not be singled
out for different and less favorable treatment"); 122 CONG. REc. 35,118 (1976) (statement of Rep.
Seiberling) ("All we are trying to do in this bill is to provide for uniform treatment [of protecting
civil rights with enforcing other interests such as antitrust] .... ); see also Berger, supra note 14, at
311 (legislative history indicates civil rights laws should be just as vigorously enforced as antitrust
laws); cf 122 CONG. REc. 35,123 (1976) (statement of Rep. Drinan) (Congress has determined civil
rights enforcement to be of "highest importance").
153. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 26, at 6 (fees should be adequate "but which do not
produce windfalls to attorneys"), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5913; 122
CONG. REc. 33,314 (1976) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (purpose of bill not to aid lawyers but to
promote civil rights); cf id. at 31,473 (statement of Sen. Allen) (expressing fears that the bill would
"provide more bonanzas to the legal profession").
154. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing Laffey).
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less than an antitrust fee award.155 An approach that results in such
discrepancies effectively assigns relative priorities to statutory rights that
have not been prioritized by Congress. 5 6 Theoretically, the opportunity
cost method would award to any attorney of comparable skill and cre-
dentials in the same legal market virtually identical hourly rates, whether
the award be made in an antitrust, environmental, or civil rights case.
In addition, the opportunity cost method does not contravene Con-
gress's desire to avoid conferring windfalls upon attorneys. Certainly,
many public-spirited attorneys would receive higher fees than would
have been minimally required to attract them to civil rights cases. How-
ever, if that were the only criterion for defining "windfall," the Supreme
Court's decision in Blum would not be justified. In Blum, public interest
lawyers, inspired to undertake civil rights representation for less than the
market rate for such legal services, received market-rate awards.15 7 Ar-
guably, those attorneys received windfalls. However, the legislative his-
tory of section 1988 indicates that Congress would not consider such an
award a windfall. Rather, given Congress's two other expressed goals, a
windfall involves an award that exceeds a level required to fully enforce
civil rights laws. As this Note has argued, compensation on the basis of
opportunity cost is required to ensure full enforcement of civil rights
laws and such compensation does not, by definition, provide windfalls.15 8
A remaining question regarding congressional intent is whether the
opportunity cost method offends the examples that Congress provided in
the legislative history to shape reasonable fee awards. Congress provided
four specific examples of cases in which the-fees awarded were adequate
but not windfalls.1 59 Although some commentators might argue that the
155. See Berger, supra note 14, at 310-11 & n.125 (discussing discrepancy in fee awards),
156. See id. at 311 ("the practical effect of awarding fees in private antitrust cases that are four
to five times higher than those awarded in Title VII cases is to make private antitrust cases finan-
cially more attractive to the legal profession").
157. Blum v. Stenson 465 U.S. 886, 892-96 (1984); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463
(1989) (compensation for paralegals at rates above cost does not confer a windfall).
158. Windfalls arise from remuneration above that necessary to attract sufficient quantities of
capital or labor inputs, not simply from compensation in a market where prices are generally increas-
ing. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of economic rents). Sup-
pose, for example, Factory X advertises in a local newspaper that 100 positions are available at five
dollars per hour. One hundred twenty people apply and 100 are hired at the five dollar hourly rate.
Later, the price and demand for Factory X's product rises such that the company anticipates the
need for 100 more workers. From the response to its previous advertisement, Factory X knows that
it must increase wages to attract 100 more workers. Thus, the first 100 employed will receive raises
to reflect increasing labor costs even though the initial lower wage proved enough to attract them to
work. Whenever demand for labor increases, the original workers generally will receive more than
required to attract them. To label the raising of compensation a proscribed windfall would mean
that supply of labor must remain static.
159. S. RaP. No. 1011, supra note 26, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5913 (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974);
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precedent established by those cases would preclude the use of an oppor-
tunity cost method to calculate attorney fees, a closer examination of the
cases and Congress's intent in citing them indicates otherwise.
Two of the cases-Stanford Daily v. Zurcher 160 and Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 161-appear to be at odds on the issue of
opportunity cost. The Stanford Daily court specifically stated that a se-
curities lawyer should not receive his typical hourly rate when litigating a
civil rights claim.162 The Johnson court, in comparison, held that one
factor to be considered is the "otherwise available business" precluded by
the representation in the case at hand.163 Significantly, Congress specifi-
cally sanctioned the Johnson factors but stated only that the court cor-
rectly applied certain of those factors in Stanford Daily. Johnson appears
to accept as one factor, although not expressly, an opportunity cost
method by considering otherwise available business. Stanford Daily,
however, did not have to apply the opportunity cost factor to reach its
conclusion; it simply considered and rejected the use of opportunity cost
in dicta.164 Thus, one could argue that Stanford Daily's rejection of op-
portunity cost as a valid factor was not part of the holding that Congress
sanctioned.
The Supreme Court, in Blanchard v. ,Bergeron, wrestled with an-
other apparent inconsistency between Johnson and the three district
court cases cited in the Senate Report, this time on the issue of a contin-
gent fee agreement's effect on a section 1983 award.' 65 The Court held in
favor of the position taken by the district courts, presumably because the
issue of contingent fee agreements was addressed in the holdings of the
district court opinions and because that particular Johnson factor "stand-
ing alone, is not dispositive."' 166 The Blanchard opinion, however, does
little to resolve the issue of opportunity cost since only one district court
addressed the problem in dicta while all three district courts addressed
the contingent fee issue in their holdings.
While such hair-splitting is somewhat instructive on the issue of op-
portunity cost, placing too much reliance on inconsistent lower federal
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8
E.P.D. 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483
(W.D.N.C. 1975)).
160. 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
161. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
162. 64 F.R.D. at 684.
163. 488 F.2d at 718.
164. See 64 F.R.D. at 684-85.
165. 109 S. Ct. 939, 943-44, n.6 (1989) (discussing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D. N.C. 1975); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974); and Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal 1974)).
166. Blanchard, 109 S. Ct. at 944.
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court cases to justify a result contrary to the mandate of section 1988
proves dangerous. As Judge Starr stated in his Cumberland Mountains
dissent, "It is, upon reflection, odd for the court to stake so much in the
interpretive exercise on such a slender reed as case cites found in the
bowels of secondary materials produced in the word processors of Capi-
tol Hill." 167 Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Blanchard,
echoed Judge Starr's reluctance to emphasize the lower court decisions
cited in the Senate Report. In Justice Scalia's opinion, the majority's
reference "to the citation of three District Court cases in a document
issued by a single committee of a single house as the action of Congress
displays the level of unreality that our unrestrained use of legislative his-
tory has attained."1 68 One Congressman even noted that the standards
sanctioned in the Committee Report are "evolving."' 169 Thus, if section
1988 purports to provide full enforcement of civil rights, and full enforce-
ment requires an opportunity cost model: for attorney compensation,
then the passing reference to inconsistent cases in the legislative history
should not stand in the way of adopting such a model.
C. Real- World Implications
This Note has maintained that a shift to an opportunity cost method
of calculating a reasonable fee will result in the optimal supply of civil
rights enforcement, since citizens will have an incentive to accurately
state demand, and supply will be adequate to meet any such demand.
This section focuses on whether certain real-world economic conditions
will lead to inefficient enforcement or "rent-seeking behavior"'170 among
attorneys under an opportunity cost regime. Although theoretically the
opportunity cost method will be a Pareto-efficient improvement in civil
rights enforcement, there is a risk that such improvement may not be
"desirable" if there is a constraint on one of the Pareto-efficient condi-
tions under the theory of "the second best."'171 Two real-world consider-
ations could impose such constraints, leading to the overprovision of civil
167. Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en
bane) (Starr, J., dissenting).
168. Blanchard, 109 S. Ct. at 947 (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. 122 CONG. REC. 35,123 (1976) (statement of Rep. Drinan).
170. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text (defining rents).
171. The theory of the second best states that "if there is introduced into a general equilibrium
system a constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Pare-
tian conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable." Lipsey & Lancaster,
The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rv. ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956). In other words, there is a
real danger in "piecemeal planning" that ignores the strategic behavior on the part of citizens and
attorneys and its effect on the Paretian improvement discussed in this Note. See I. LITrLE, A CRI-
TIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 89 (1950) (discussing how "piecemeal" or "utopian" planning ig-
nores the effects of a Paretian improvement on income distribution). However, while the theory of
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rights enforcement: (1) whether the opportunity cost method allows liti-
gants to bear so little of the cost of bringing suit that their demand for
civil rights enforcement will exceed the Pareto-efficient level, and (2)
whether rent-seeking behavior on the part of attorneys will lead to artifi-
cially inflated opportunity costs.
1. Non-optimal Demand for Enforcement. Enforcement of civil
rights is expensive.172 If consumers of civil rights enforcement do not
have to bear the cost of successfully vindicating important social rights,
but also face no costs of vindicating extremely trivial, imagined, or base-
less rights, then the consumer is likely to xaggerate his demand.1 73
The structure of our civil rights laws, however, in conjunction with
the "prevailing party" requirement, safeguards against such excess de-
mand. For example, freedom of speech jurisprudence has evolved to the
point where courts balance the public interest in free and open speech
with the public interest in an orderly society.174 Consequently, a party
prevails only when he can show that the public interest in free speech
sufficiently outweighs the interest in social order. If the party fails, he
then bears the cost of his own attorney's fees; if the suit is found frivo-
lous, he bears some of the costs of the opposing party. 175 Thus, the party
is required to assess the merits of his case and the social cost of bringing
the case,176 and therefore will rationally bring only those cases that have
the second best requires us to "proceed cautiously," it does not require paralysis. Misham, Second
Thoughts on Second Best, 14 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (n.s.) 205, 216 (1962).
172. See, eg., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 581 (1986) (prevailing party awarded
$33,350 in damages and attorneys fees of $245,456).
Assuming that the dollars dedicated to enforcing a civil right is aprivate good, then one can say
that the RPT, see supra note 77 and accompanying text for definition, of the private good for the
public good increases as more rights are enforced.
173. This implies that the RPT is greater than the MRS. As each enforced right becomes in-
creasingly trivial, the public interest in abridging that right increases; thus the public is more willing
to substitute infringement of rights for protection of those trivial rights. Therefore, the MRS of the
public interest in "abridging" compared to the public interest in "protecting" will decrease.
174. See, eg., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 506-09 (1951) ("Overthrow of the Govern-
ment by force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit
speech."); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (free speech does not protect a man from
falsely shouting fire in a theatre). See generally Hart, Utilitarianism and Natural Rights, 53 TUL. L.
REV. 663, 673-80 (1979) (discussing the clash between utilitarianism and rights philosophies that
gave rise to the current state of civil rights jurisprdence); A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY:
THE BIG TRADEOFF 6-9 (1975) (same); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1983)
(same).
175. See Roper v. Edwards, 815 F.2d 1474, 1478 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding civil rights claim
frivolous and awarding fees to defendant); Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 230 (9th Cir. 1980) (same).
Thus the party must weigh both the MRS and the RPT. A rational consumer will seek enforcement
to the point where the MRS equals the RPT-the Pareto-efficient level of enforcement.
176. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing Pareto efficiency).
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some chance of success-a result that Congress likely would find
desirable.
2. Rent-Seeking Behavior by Attorneys. Critics of the opportunity
cost method will be quick to point out that rational civil rights attorneys
will attempt to shift their practices into the highest-paying areas of the
legal profession, leading to artificially inflated attorneys' fees awards and
a decreased level of expertise among most civil rights attorneys. This
criticism, however, makes a crucial assumption-that paying attorneys'
opportunity costs will drive fee awards up, and that the upward move-
ment is per se inefficient. At some point, obviously, a fee award will be
too high, but any upward movement in awards is not necessarily bad for
society. An examination of when a fee award is too high reveals that fee
awards based accurately on opportunity costs can never be high enough
to be inefficient.
When is a fee award too high? Economists have responded to this
type of question with the concept of economic rent. To economists, a
resource owner is paid too much (receives a "rent") for his resource only
if the payment exceeds the owner's next best alternative use, i.e., the
owner's opportunity cost. 177 Rents can positively affect society by stimu-
lating entrepreneurial decisions,178 but the existence of rent indicates a
loss of social welfare through inefficient resource allocation (monopoly
rents) 179 and through resources spent in the pursuit of that rent.180 Yet,
so long as the resource owner is paid his opportunity cost, rents-by
definition-will not arise.
The extension of economic rent analysis to civil rights enforcement
can best be illustrated with an example. If X, a tax attorney, is paid $200
per hour on average, the market has presumably determined that X's
services are worth that amount. If X spends five hours on a civil rights
case, X's opportunity cost equals $1000. Society loses $1000 in services
in the tax field, but gains at least $1000 in the area of civil rights.1"1
Thus, granting X an award of $1000 in a civil rights case does not confer
a rent on X, because he receives only his opportunity cost, and society
177. See Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575, 577 (1982).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 576.
180. For example, lobbying expenses and expenses of transferring resources to rent-conferring
activities constitute such waste. See generally Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent.Seeking
Society, 64 AM. ECON. REv., June 1974, at 291, 291-303 (discussing substantial deadweight costs of
rent-seeking behavior in the granting of international trade licenses); Tollison, supra note 177, at
575-82 (discussing wastefulness of resources spent in pursuit of transfers).
181. The gain is at least $1000 because of the congressionally determined preeminence of civil
rights, as opposed to economic rights, in our society. See supra note 152.
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does not suffer a loss in welfare from inefficient allocation of legal
resources.
Suppose now that X is a full-time public interest attorney. Critics
might suggest that X could take a few tax or securities cases per year and
use those cases to inflate his opportunity cost. Realistically, the criticism
fails because no attorney can build a successful practice in any area by
taking a few isolated cases per year. The public interest attorney who
takes on a small tax client with the intent of inflating his billing rate for
later fee shifting probably will not accomplish his goal. Technically,
however, even if the attorney could take one case per year and charge a
high rate for that case, that high rate still properly reflects his opportu-
nity cost. A fee award based on that opportunity cost does not, by defini-
tion, confer an economic rent. 182 Rather, opportunity cost fee awards
more accurately reflect the value of civil rights enforcement and thus
would lead to a more efficient allocation of resources.
Arguably, awarding an attorney's opportunity cost also could lead
to "dabbling" in civil rights litigation by high-priced lawyers and a de-
crease in the overall expertise of civil rights attorneys. A simple example
proves otherwise, however. Suppose attorneys A, B, and C are of identi-
cal age and have the same educational credentials and length of experi-
ence. Suppose also A is a full-time public interest lawyer who places a
positive value on representing civil rights claimants such that he would
be indifferent between representing a civil rights plaintiff for $50 per hour
and any other client for $100 per hour. B specializes in commercial liti-
gation and is indifferent between representing a civil rights plaintiff for
$90 per hour and any other client for $100 per hour. Thus, B rarely
represents civil rights plaintiffs-usually only when his conscience gets
the better of him. C specializes in securities litigation and charges a very
high fee. C places no positive or negative value on representing civil
rights plaintiffs and thus never undertakes such representation.
Under the present method of determining reasonable fees, only A
will specialize in civil rights laws, while B will only "dabble" in the area,
and C will obtain no exposure to the area. Under an opportunity cost
model, A will still specialize (and will be better paid) in civil rights repre-
sentation, and B will greatly increase his civil rights caseload, and might
even specialize in civil rights if his market composite rate would be $90
or higher. C, wanting to maintain his securities litigation practice and
billable hours, will undertake an occasional civil rights case. Thus, in
this situation, the general argument that an opportunity cost standard
182. Significantly, rents would most likely arise in those situations in which Congress attempts
to fix by statute a reasonable fee-say $100. In that case, attorneys with low opportunity costs could
collect rents on their services.
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would reduce overall expertise is not persuasive. Many attorneys who
place a premium on representing civil rights plaintiffs, or whose billing
rates are close to their market composite rates, would be coaxed into
specializing in civil rights litigation. Thus, the number of new dabblers
could well be offset or surpassed by the number of new specialists.
D. Fairness to the Defendant
Critics of the opportunity cost method surely will argue that this
method is unfair to the defendant. Why should defendant X pay $200
per hour in fee awards while defendant Y pays only $100 simply because
X is opposed by a tax attorney while Y is opposed by a full-time public
interest attorney? A completely satisfactory answer for such critics prob-
ably does not exist. The lack of such a satisfactory answer, however, has
not prevented such developments in analogous situations. In the law of
torts:
[I]f a person fires [a gun] across a road when it is dangerous to do so
and kills a man who is in receipt of a large income, he will be liable for
the whole damage, however great, that may have resulted to his family,
and cannot set up that he could not have reasonably expected to have
injured any one but a labourer. 183
Such inconsistencies seem incongruous with the goal of deterrence
because defendants cannot properly gauge the riskiness of their conduct.
Furthermore, the result is disturbing to the extent that tort law places a
value on a life, or an opportunity-cost system creates a penalty for a
wrong, based wholly on fortuitous circumstances. Yet, tort law's empha-
sis on complete compensation for injuries has supported the use of an
opportunity cost method of calculating damages: what would the survi-
vor's income have been had the decedent's resources been put to the best
alternative use (i.e., lost earnings)? Likewise in the area of civil rights,
Congress has mandated the complete enforcement of civil rights laws.
Consequently, we must live with the tensions between the mandate of
complete enforcement and the goal of deterrence.
CONCLUSION
Reasonable-fee jurisprudence needs improvement and clarification.
With satellite litigation over fee awards absorbing significant judicial re-
sources, future congressional reform of fee shifting in civil rights cases is
desirable to inject expressly the theory of opportunity cost into calculat-
ing reasonable fees for prevailing parties. This Note has shown, however,
183. Smith v. London & South Western Ry., 6 L.R.-C.P. 14, 22-23 (1870 (Blackburn, J.); see
also Kubista v. Romaine, 14 Wash. App. 58, 62-63, 538 P.2d 812, 815 (1975) (lost earning capacity
always part of tort damages).
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that absent such reform, courts could take a systematic, public-goods ap-
proach to the problem consistent with congressional intent. The enforce-
ment of civil rights is a public good, and, if recognized as such, a method
of calculating reasonable fees arises from a relatively simple public goods
analysis.
A court adopting the opportunity costs approach used in this Note
would necessarily depart from established reasonable-fee caselaw.
Courts currently use typical market rates for similar attorneys doing sim-
ilar work. This Note advocates the use of rates established by the attor-
ney's opportunity cost of taking the civil rights case. The fee award
should reflect the rate that the attorney would have been able to charge
in her normal area of expertise-in areas other than civil rights. A fee
award based on the attorney's opportunity cost will result in accurate
expression of demand for civil rights enforcement and an adequate sup-
ply of civil rights attorneys to meet that demand.
William R. Mureiko
